BPC Proposal to Reform the Debt Limit

Debt limit brinkmanship has become a recurring habit in Congress. Because the United States will keep accruing debt, it will likely continue to face yearly run-ins with the debt limit absent reform. While brinkmanship may score short-term political points, it also inflicts real harm on the economy and American taxpayers. In the face of potentially disastrous consequences of crossing the X Date—the point at which the United States would no longer be able to meet all of its obligations in full and on time—why does the current process for raising the debt limit persist?

The most common answer—that the debt limit acts as a check on federal borrowing—has proven false. Under both parties, Congress has enacted policies that are driving up deficits. The purported benefits of the debt limit have not materialized in recent years, while the costs have become clear. To durably protect the full faith and credit of the United States, policymakers should come together and pass legislation to defuse the debt limit before the government nears—or even worse, crosses—the next X Date.

BPC has drafted a framework for debt limit reform to do just that, illustrated in Figure 1. The proposal would align the debt limit with the annual budget process, so that if Congress adopts a fiscally responsible concurrent budget resolution, it would send legislation to the president suspending the debt limit through the fiscal year to which the resolution applies. Congress has operated in similar fashion before. In fact, this approach is a modified version of the so-called Gephardt Rule, which for years was used by the House of Representatives to deem an increase in the debt limit when the House passed its budget resolution. If Congress fails to pass an identical budget resolution through both chambers, or if the federal government is within 60 days of reaching its statutory debt limit, the president would be allowed to request an expedited debt limit extension, which would need to be accompanied by a debt reduction proposal sent to Congress. The president’s request would automatically suspend the debt limit through the end of the subsequent fiscal year, subject to a vote of disapproval from Congress. This framework achieves two objectives: first, to take the possibility of a default on the government’s obligations off the table; and second, to provide a vehicle to focus policymakers on the country’s broader fiscal challenges.

Figure 1: Processes for Suspending the Debt Limit Under BPC’s Framework

Bipartisan legislation introduced in 2022, the Responsible Budgeting Act, advances these twin goals. The legislation provides two new mechanisms for raising the debt limit. If Congress adopts a concurrent budget resolution that reduces the ratio of debt to gross domestic product (debt-to-GDP ratio) in the 10th year by at least 5 percentage points, the resolution would automatically trigger legislation for the president’s signature that would suspend the debt limit through the end of the following fiscal year. If Congress has not passed a budget resolution meeting that criterion by April 15 of a given year, the president would be able to request a suspension of the debt limit in tandem with a debt reduction proposal to Congress (meeting the same target as specified above). The suspension would go into effect barring a congressional resolution of disapproval, while the debt reduction proposal would jump-start a structured committee process whereby competing proposals could be offered and result in a vote(s) on the floor of both chambers to advance deficit reducing legislation.

Policymakers have an opportunity to come together across the aisle and permanently reform the process for raising the debt limit, ending this recurring crisis once and for all and refocusing attention on the country’s underlying fiscal challenge.

A summary of the Responsible Budgeting Act can be found here.